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Introduction 
 
Like a variety of international activities which purport to spread peace, statebuilding – ‘the 
creation of new government institutions and strengthening existing ones’ – has greatly 
expanded since the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama, 2004:ix). Many non-western countries 
have been or continue to be the subject of these initiatives which are generally led by 
international organisations (the United Nations and the World Bank most prominently) and 
western states. Proponents of statebuilding and policymakers or ‘statebuilders’ themselves 
claim that statebuilding is a solution to a multitude of issues in ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ states, 
such as civil conflict, economic development, poverty, organised crime, corruption, mass 
migration, and terrorism (Rotberg, 2002). 
Violent civil conflict is the most serious and widespread problem which 
statebuilding is regularly employed to tackle: it aims to ‘help prevent, transform, and 
resolve conflicts’ (Branch, 2011:39). But, as Carol Bacchi (2009) has pointed out, policies 
construct ‘problems’ in certain ways which promote specific ‘solutions’ in response. It is 
therefore important to reflect on how policymakers understand and talk about this problem 
of conflict, and the relationship between conflict and states. By critically analysing 
statebuilding policy documents, I will argue that statebuilders represent conflict as 
destructive of states and forms of political order and governance. This is a dramatic 
departure from a large body of academic work on domestic state formation which conceives 
that conflict can, and may even be necessary to, produce states. Yet, the particular narrative 
offered by statebuilders serves a vital purpose: it legitimises their statebuilding 
interventions.  
In order to make this conceptual argument, the following proceeds in five key steps. 
The first section introduces statebuilding, the relevant literature, and the methodology of 
this thesis. Second, statebuilding policy documents since the end of the Cold War are 
examined in relation to how they represent violent conflict and states. The third turns to a 
body of academic work which I will call the ‘domestic state formation literature’, which 
offers competing conceptions of the relationship between conflict and states. The purpose 
here is not to side with either argument but, fourthly, to expose and draw out their major 
divergences. The final section attempts to make sense of statebuilders’ narratives about 
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conflict, and explores their effects on policy: they help legitimise the norm and practice of 
international statebuilding. 
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I. Literature Review and Methodology 
 
 
The broad idea of statebuilding as externally led efforts to construct or reconstruct certain 
types of political institutions was not new to the 1990s. It has a long history; the most notable 
projects include states created by European colonisers, Germany and Japan after 1945, and 
Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s (Gawthorpe, 2016). Statebuilding since end of the Cold War 
has been situated within the major expansion of global governance which, due to the 
reduced threat of interstate war, directed great attention to threats emanating from intrastate 
or so-called ‘new’ wars (Kaldor, 1999). Much has been written about how the United 
Nations, other international organisations, and western states found a new role in the world 
that professed the importance of keeping and building peace around the world (Curtis, 
2013).  
The emerging era of cooperation in this sphere was formally marked by the 1992 An 
Agenda for Peace, which called for action among states, international and regional 
organisations to promote peace. Alongside reaffirming the importance of ‘preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping’, the concept of peacebuilding is introduced 
(UN, 1992: para.5). This is defined as a post-conflict endeavour to ‘identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict’ (UN, 1992: para.21). 
As Curtis points out (2013:81), practitioners and scholars have normally understood 
statebuilding as one form of peacebuilding. After wars end, international actors have indeed 
aimed to ‘consolidate or institutionalize peace’ by creating functional, legitimate states with 
inclusive and non-violent political systems (Call, 2008:5). The model of ‘the state’ is drawn 
from western models and Weberian ideas: a state which successfully claims a legitimate 
monopoly of violence (Weber, 1994[1919]:310) can thereby maintain order and peace in its 
territory, and effectively fulfil the varied functions and services of modern states. 
However, statebuilding is not solely a post-conflict activity occurring after wars such 
as in East Timor and Bosnia. In fact, such practices have been used in ‘wide spectrum of 
developing countries, both in war and peace’ (Bickerton, 2007:93). Statebuilding initiatives 
have been employed in countries with ongoing large-scale conflict, such as Somalia and 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, it has also been tied-on to military or peacekeeping 
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interventions. Iraq is one such case, as multilateral statebuilding followed military invasion 
that saw the fall of Saddam Hussein. Libya, at the time of writing, is the recipient of major 
international efforts to form effective and legitimate systems of government, which followed 
the 2011 NATO intervention under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
Statebuilding is therefore a policy that can have multiple and often overlapping 
aims: to recover from past conflict, resolve and transform ongoing conflicts, and prevent a 
return to violence in the future (Branch, 2011:26). In doing so, it also can denote a range of 
activities surrounding the construction of legitimate and capable states, including, as 
Chandler points out (2010:1) a wide variety of initiatives which encourage ‘good 
governance’. 
Academic scholarship on the subject of statebuilding has expanded in line with the 
rising prominence of the practice at both national and international levels of governance. 
Now extensive, the scholarly literature generally divides along Cox’s (1981) distinction 
between problem-solving and critical approaches. The former kind ‘takes the world as it 
finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which 
they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (Cox, 1981:128). Problem-solving 
works on statebuilding subscribe to the liberal peace paradigm – that democracy and 
capitalism together promote peaceful states – and therefore also to the premise that weak 
states require international intervention to help reconstruction in order to achieve well 
functioning, stable, peaceful states (Kumar, 1997; Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner, 2004; 
Chesterman et al., 2005; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Call and Wyeth, 2008; Miller, 2013). Writers 
intend to make existing structures and policy practices more effective. Therefore, criticism 
here may well be attuned to the ‘dilemmas’ (Paris and Sisk, 2009) or ‘paradoxes’ (Zaum, 
2007) of statebuilding but will remain within the liberal peace consensus and may offer 
policy recommendations.  
Problem-solving approaches ‘in which attention has been largely placed on technical 
and administrative problems of policy-making’ indeed constitute the majority of scholarly 
work on statebuilding (Chandler, 2010:3), but critical approaches are also well-established. 
These aim to call into question ‘social and power relations’ by ‘standing apart from the 
prevailing order of the world and asking how that order came about’ (Cox, 1981:129). 
Critical scholars examine statebuilding discourses, assumptions, ideas, concepts, and 
Benjamin Simpson     s1899465  5 
practices, while being attentive to the global and historical dimensions of power. This thesis 
falls under the banner of critical approaches, as it examines the conceptions statebuilders 
hold, and the narratives they promote about violent civil conflict and its connection to states. 
Before describing my approach and contribution in more detail, it is worth briefly 
expanding on existing critical work.   
Power dynamics are one main point of critique for these approaches. Stemming from 
Cox’s (1981:128) contention that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ many 
scholars have questioned how statebuilding practices and discourse serve certain global 
power relations. Analysis focuses on the ways in which statebuilding discourses naturalise 
and its practices secure the nation-state system based around the UN, and the global 
governance framework that surrounds it (Berger and Weber, 2006; Chandler, 2010; Milliken 
and Krause, 2002). Terms such as ‘postmodern imperialism’ (Fearon and Laitin, 2004), and 
‘empire in denial’ (Chandler, 2006) have been used to critique the self-interested and 
somewhat hegemonic intentions behind seemingly altruistic post-conflict reconstruction. In 
a similar vein, the dominance of neoliberal ideas in statebuilding has received significant 
criticism. Moore (2000), Guttal (2005), and Howarth (2014), for instance, expose how 
neoliberal reforms are pushed on reconstructed countries, thereby shaping states to serve 
global free markets.  
A second core focus of critical works is statebuilding discourses: the policy 
framework and the ideas, norms, values and concepts it promotes. Sovereignty is one such 
frequently debated concept. Bickerton (2007) not only makes the bold and convincing 
empirical case that statebuilding fails to promote sovereignty, he also makes the conceptual 
argument that statebuilding policy is in fact premised on a radical critique of liberal notions 
of sovereignty, as it denies others’ capacity for self-rule, and considers external regulation 
necessary. For Bickerton (2007:93), this causes its ultimate failure, because by ‘removing 
popular will from the process of political creation… [it] produces hollow institutions with 
shallow roots’. In a more recent book, Chandler (2010) expands this conceptual reflection on 
whether statebuilding is truly liberal. It is not so much guided by liberal values, he 
concludes, but is a post-liberal critique of classical liberal ideas of rights, law, politics, 
democracy and sovereignty, where these ideas are ‘inverted and transformed’ (2010:4). 
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Rather than taking for granted the ideas, conceptions, norms and values in 
statebuilding practices and discourses, critical approaches questions them. They have 
therefore been framed around the notion that ideas and power are connected, often in 
complex ways. It interrogates how they hold together, what power dynamics they indicate 
and serve, and what their effects are in terms of shaping ‘real-world’ deployment of 
statebuilding policies.  
One avenue of critical analysis, however, has been under-appreciated. Existing 
critical work has examined the statebuilding policy framework largely in terms of what it 
does or aims to do. This is to focus what actions or ‘solutions’ policies promote. In contrast, 
this thesis aims to take a step back by reflecting on the ‘problems’ that statebuilders claim to 
tackle in the first instance. In particular, I examine how statebuilding policymakers, in states 
and international organisations, have understood these ‘problems’. This pursuit is fuelled by 
Carol Bacchi’s (2009) general method of policy analysis, which asks ‘what is the problem 
represented to be?’ This approach is grounded in post-structuralist theory, with the core 
contention that problems are not pre-given. They do not simply ‘exist’, but are social 
constructions. Events or situations are interpreted, theorised and considered ‘problems’ by 
policymakers and academics (Bacchi, 2009:xi). 
Applying this method to statebuilding, we must begin with the contention that 
statebuilders do not simply respond to the world ‘as it is’. By posing and constructing 
‘problems’ in certain ways, they promote specific policies in response.   Thus, employing 
Bacchi's (2009) approach, the key questions on which this thesis is centred are: What are the 
problems which statebuilders are concerned with and believe can be solved through 
statebuilding? How do they understand and represent these problems in their policies? 
What are the effects of these representations? Rather than taking these representations for 
granted, are they contestable?  
To be sure, Chandler (2010) does formulate a similar approach (albeit without 
explicitly drawing on Bacchi). He describes statebuilding as a ‘paradigm’ (2010:8): a way of 
understanding the world and engaging with it. Indeed he (2010:10) asks ‘how do 
international statebuilders understand the world?’ and ‘how are different problems 
constructed or understood’? Chandler focuses on how statebuilders narrate the conceptual 
problems around governance, politics and sovereignty in the non-west. Absent from his 
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work is the more fundamental, empirical problem that statebuilders claim to tackle: violent 
civil conflict. As will be described in the following section, statebuilding policy documents 
are concerned with a wide range of phenomena such as civil war, genocide, anarchic violent, 
rebellion, insurgency, violent protest, organised crime, national, cross-border and 
international terrorism.  
The pronounced intentions of statebuilding are to prevent conflict, to end conflict, 
and/or to consolidate peace. This thesis offers a vital detailed, critical reflection on how this 
problem is represented. I will therefore analyse how statebuilders understand and represent 
violent civil conflict and the relationship between conflict and the process of state formation, 
strengthening or weakening.  These representations form narratives (Wibben, 2011:2; Butler, 
2009:8): ways of presenting, understanding and telling a certain story about the 
phenomenon of violent conflict and its relationship to states. Subsequently, this thesis 
explores the impact of these narratives, by questioning the strategies and policies they 
legitimise. 
To do so, I examine official documents, policy papers and statements published by 
the international organisations and states that are most prominent in promoting and 
implementing statebuilding. I will examine a range of documents published since the end of 
the Cold War by the United Nations, World Bank, UK Department for International 
Development, G7, and others. While academic critiques do not always give major attention 
to these publications, they are worth examining because they are the formal and official 
views of the organisations. Policy documents reflect, and also are likely to play a role in 
shaping and solidifying the norms, values, and strategies of these organisations and their 
partners. Most importantly, they also serve as the public justification for statebuilding. I 
therefore use them to examine how statebuilders present violent conflict and how they 
legitimise and promote statebuilding as an appropriate response. 
While analysis of problem-representation has been largely ignored in the 
statebuilding literature, there exists some critique of this kind in relation to the ‘failed state’. 
This concept was brought into academic discourse in the early 1990s by the influential works 
of Helman and Ratner (1992) and Zartman (1995). It lacks a strict definitional consensus, but 
functions as a general label or framework used to denote certain kinds of (non-western) 
states which are deemed to fail to fulfil the necessary criteria of properly functioning states, 
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such as capacity and legitimacy.  The set of ideas around failed states, or its various 
substitute labels of ‘fragile’, ‘failing’ or ‘weak’ states, have since been regularly used in the 
discourses surrounding a variety of policy areas such as development, aid, humanitarian 
intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, human rights, democracy promotion and, of 
course, statebuilding. 
Critical scholars have lobbied various challenges to the concept. Most closely related 
to this topic of how ‘problems’ are represented, it has been regularly dismissed for 
abstracting states from the global and historical contexts in which they are embedded (Bilgin 
and Morton, 2002; Bøås and Jennings, 2005; Call, 2008; Jones, 2008). As Jones (2008:184) 
demonstrates through the western depictions of the ‘failed state’ of Somalia, when  the 
problems of Third World states as narrated as internal issues of bad governance, the ‘deeply 
historical and structural causes’ of their conditions are ignored. This serves to legitimise 
continuing interventions and allows the ‘reproduction and entrenchment’ of current 
western-dominated global power relations (Jones, 2008:184). 
The ‘failed state’ is not synonymous with civil conflict, but is a broader concept 
which includes a range of different problems such as lack of state capacity, failure to provide 
public services, mass corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, unresponsive to public demands, 
and a disregard for the rule of law. Violence does often takes centre-stage in the depictions 
of such states, and it appears to loom large as its most catastrophic consequence and cause 
(Curtis, 2013:81). While critical scholars recognise that ‘failed states’ are viewed as extremely 
violent, they do not analyse how policymakers understand this conflict and, in particular, 
the relationship between conflict and the state itself.  
Given that statebuilding practices are used to strengthen or rebuild weak states that 
are undergoing conflict, it is vital that we critically reflect on how statebuilders understand 
and represent such conflict and its role with regard to state formation, strength or weakness. 
This thesis can thus be located within, while advancing, the broader critical work on both 
statebuilding and failed states. It delves into how one type of policy area – statebuilding – 
narrates one important element of the failed state – violent civil conflict. It therefore also 
draws on Branch’s (2011) method: he analyses the ways in which Africa is understood and 
represented in popular, academic and international policy discourses, and examines how 
they legitimise ubiquitous interventions in Africa under the banner of human rights. This 
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thesis takes a similar critical interrogation of how problems are represented, and what the 
effects are on legitimising certain policies. Its contribution is to apply this approach to the 
narrower topic statebuilding, while not being exclusive to Africa as Branch’s account is. 
While the method of analysing how problems are represented is not new, this thesis 
is novel in applying it to statebuilding and thus makes an important contribution to critical 
work on the topic. The unique methodological step this thesis offers is to juxtapose 
statebuilding policies to a body of academic literature on domestic state formation. It is 
surprising that critical scholars have not brought in this political, historical and sociological 
research; it is useful for exploring how and why external statebuilding departs from the 
evidence and theory on how states have been formed historically. 
By applying these methods, I will make three core arguments. Firstly, statebuilders 
represent violent conflict as destructive of states and all forms of political governance. 
Second, that this is in fact a dramatic departure from the domestic state formation literature 
which, in contrast, suggests that states are formed through processes of violent conflict.  This 
illustrates that statebuilders’ narratives are far from inevitable, but are highly contestable. In 
exploring how to make sense of them, I end with a third, conceptual and critical argument: 
the narratives about violent conflict promoted by statebuilders are vital for legitimising their 
interventions.      
Narrating violent conflict as solely destructive of states makes organic domestic 
solutions appear impossible. This legitimises external actors’ statebuilding interventions as 
the only way to build political governance. When combined with a pledged commitment to 
humanitarian ethics and the representation of violent conflict as ‘crisis’, statebuilding 
interventions are also considered an urgent moral necessity to save lives and secure human 
rights. It thereby legitimises external stifling of new organic possibilities for alternative 
forms of political organisation which may result from violent conflict. These may include 
boundary changes, sub-state, or non-state formations. Thus, statebuilders’ narrative that 
violent conflict destroys states ultimately enables the maintenance of status quo 
international arrangements. 
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II. The Statebuilding policy literature 
 
This section analyses the official policy documents published by international organisations 
and states – namely the U.S. and the UK given their particularly active role in international 
statebuilding practices. Understanding statebuilding as a ‘paradigm’ or policy framework is 
not to suggest that the discourses within it are homogenous. Variation is likely to appear 
across several axes. Policies and the ways they are formulated have changed over time, even 
in the near-three decades time frame since the end of the Cold War that this thesis focuses 
on. Organisations and states each have their own agendas, purposes and intended 
audiences, and similarly, policy documents take different forms, such as short agreements to 
long, comprehensive reports. While disaggregation of the statebuilding policy literature is a 
worthwhile endeavour, this thesis is more interested in its unifying commonalities. I wish to 
examine the conceptions held widely throughout the policy literature, in an attempt to 
expose the general narratives at work. Therefore, the following offers a broad analysis which 
highlights the key elements in how the policy literature represents violent conflict and the 
relationship between conflict and states – their formation, strengthening and weakening.  
A point in need of clarification concerns the definitions of conflict and violence. Both 
are extremely hard to define, and this has important implications for how to measure and 
analyse trends of conflict, and for how peace is defined (see Galtung, 1969; Keen, 2000; 
Sambanis, 2004; Bufacchi, 2005; Cramer, 2006). Despite this, violence, conflict and peace are 
in fact extremely ill-defined in the statebuilding policy literature. Descriptions of what these 
involve are forthcoming, but stated definitions are rare. Rather than getting caught up in 
definitional difficulties, then, it is more fruitful in this project to simply run with 
statebuilding literature. While recognising the flaws in conceptual precision of the 
documents, it still possible to examine how statebuilders think about and represent violent 
conflict. Therefore, the below analysis will mix up different types of civil conflict because the 
policy documents regularly discuss them collectively and without rigid distinction too. 
 In fact, policymakers’ vagueness is itself significant because it allows ‘violence’ or 
‘violent conflict’ to be employed flexibly. The terms can be used to denote a variety of issues 
such as organised crime, terrorism, rebellion, insurgency, violent protest, and gang violence. 
Clustering these together may signal the simplistic ways in which western policymakers 
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understand violence in other part of the world, but the loose definition does have an 
important effect: the ‘problem’ itself is immediately vague and open to elastic use. Any of 
these dynamics can represent ‘violent conflict’ which statebuilders aim to prevent or end, 
enabling a huge variety of countries and situations to be pulled into the sphere of relevance 
for policymakers.  
 
Conflict is morally undesirable  
A 2011 agreement among the G7 and 19 partners for “A New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States” marked a renewed commitment to statebuilding while refining some 
technical aspects of activities. It begins with the resounding statement: ‘1.5 billion people 
live in conflict-affected and fragile states’ and that ‘about 70% of fragile states have seen 
conflict since 1989’ (2011:1). It intends to be a powerful opening, but the terms ‘conflict’ and 
‘conflict-affected’ are undefined, and no examples are offered. Yet it remains a clear call for 
action. This perfectly captures that while ‘violent conflict’ may lack conceptual clarity in the 
statebuilding policy community, it holds clear normative status. The document need not 
explain why conflict is bad, it is assumed to be self-evidently morally undesirable.  
Emotive descriptions are still often forthcoming. The 1992 An Agenda for Peace 
marked a new era in the role of UN; without the superpower rivalry that had characterised 
international politics during the Cold War, and new cooperation could be directed towards 
threats other than interstate conflict. It notes that civil conflicts ‘continue to bring fear and 
horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring 
them to an end’ (1992, para.13). Little appears to have changed in this stance. The World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, which involves 
numerous policy recommendations including those under the banner of statebuilding, 
highlights the range of threats associated with intrastate conflict and ‘fragile’ states. Its 
micro-level description is chilling: ‘war, looting, and crime destroy the household assets of 
the poor, and fear of violent attacks prevents them from tilling their fields or travelling to 
schools, clinics, workplaces, and markets’ (2011:58). In its most recent practice paper on 
statebuilding, the UK Department for International Development similarly laments the 
products of civil conflict: ‘divided communities, traumatised children and adults, human 
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rights abuses, destroyed livelihoods, food insecurity and other humanitarian needs’ (DFID, 
2010:20). Violent conflict is considered morally undesirable because of its human impacts.  
 
Conflict is destructive 
The ‘devastating effects of violent conflict’ are wide ranging (DFID, 2010:4).  At the fore in 
these policy documents is its destructive impact on states. According to the UK’s 2011 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), which contains the country’s position on 
statebuilding policies, violent conflict undermines the ‘formal and informal institutions… on 
which long-term peace and stability depend’ (2011:4).  Most visibly, physical infrastructure 
like ‘roads, schools, hospitals, factories – can be destroyed’ (BSOS, 2011:7). More broadly, a 
country’s political, economic and social institutions are deemed to be damaged by conflict. 
For example, democracy is undermined or collapses, public services are eroded, the central 
state is no longer able to enforce a monopoly of control over its territory, taxation systems 
become less capable, and general social order cannot be maintained.  
Throughout the policy literature, violent conflict is made synonymous with a 
breakdown of governance. Instability, chaos, and state fragility are deemed tightly wedded 
as causes and consequences of civil conflict. The perceived consequences are enormous. 
Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, goes as far as to suggest that 
the ‘a collapse of state institutions’ caused by civil war results in the ‘paralysis of 
governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos’ (1995: para.13). 
More recently, following his influential Brahimi Report (2000) on global security, senior UN 
diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi argues in a 2007 paper on statebuilding that conflict ‘leads to the 
collapse of the systems and institutions that make a stable society function and these are the 
very systems that need to be resurrected’ (2007:3).  
Not only does conflict destroy, it also divides. Like natural disasters, conflicts 
‘destroy institutions, fracture social relations, and polarize political culture’ (UNDP, 
2012:12). Countries are left ‘war-torn’. According to Kozul-Wright and Fortunato’s (2011:1) 
policy-oriented book published by the UN, the ‘deep and cumulative divisions’ produced by 
civil wars in turn ‘undermine social cohesion, threaten the norms and institutions of the 
State, and create a sense of fear and distrust among citizens’. States become ‘fragmented’ to 
the point where ‘no party is capable of reestablishing central authority’ (World Bank, 
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1997:158).  Conflict is thus interpreted as ‘crisis’ (DFID, 2010:51; World Bank, 2011:1; UNDP, 
2012:11). 
As part of its destruction, the negative impact of civil conflict on economic 
development is given major attention. This derives from the generally held view that 
economic development is vital for stability: economic growth is necessary for a state to gain 
legitimacy and requires financial revenue to expand its capacities. The core policy narrative 
is that ‘conflict is the antithesis of development’ (Brahimi, 2007:19) or represents 
‘development in reverse’ (World Bank, 2003:32). This draws from econometric work on the 
‘conflict trap’, most famously promoted by Paul Collier (2003; 2008). It denotes that low 
development levels are a significant cause of civil conflict, and that conflict further ‘retards 
development’ (Brown, 2011:53) and thus ‘exacerbates poverty and inequality’ (DFID, 
2010:20). Conflict ‘erodes the tax base’, distorting development strategies while governments 
divert finances from public services to war (Brown, 2011:54).  As Branch (2011:19) points out, 
the state is therefore viewed by policymakers in one of two ways. Either it is seen as weak 
and unable to protect its population, or on the other hand, as a violent criminal actor itself 
that commits human rights abuses at the expense of its legitimacy and public capacities.  
Both the UK and U.S. have highlighted their own security concerns over this 
perceived breakdown of governance. The UK’s current National Security Strategy 
emphasises how civil violence produces ‘ungoverned spaces which can be exploited by 
terrorists and criminals’ (2016:63). This stance became dominant among many western states 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, which highlighted to western leaders the global 
dangers of far-away disorder. Statements in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review produced by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2010:xii), such as ‘weak 
governments and failing states create safe havens for terrorists, insurgencies, and criminal 
syndicates’, show a continuity with the rhetoric of the Bush administration in the immediate 
aftermath of the devastating attacks. Part of the reason why the UK and U.S. are so 
concerned with distant civil conflict, is also due to its perceived regional spill-over effects: 
‘neighbouring countries and wider regions are often destabilised by the flow of small arms 
and light weapons, mercenary or other armed groups, illicit goods and displaced people that 
conflicts can produce’ (BSOS, 2011:7). Conflict is narrated as implosion, but where the 
destruction is not confined to the one state.  
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All bad things go together 
In his 1973 critique of foreign aid, Packenham argues that Western development doctrines 
are based on an assumption that ‘all good things go together’. Peace, stability, economic 
growth, social cohesion, and justice (1973:123) have indeed been conceived as logically 
compatible and mutually reinforcing. To inverse Packenham’s observation, I find that, in 
representing the ‘problems’ which they aim to tackle, statebuilding policymakers suggest 
that all bad things go together. Policy documents often describe (although rarely explain) 
links between poverty, underdevelopment, violent conflict, disease, terrorism, crime, 
famine, corruption, unemployment, market volatility, state weakening, instability, disorder 
and general anarchy. 
The UN’s A More Secure World report (2004:14) goes so far as to call this a ‘witch’s 
brew common to those areas where civil war and regional conflict intersect’. Disordered and 
desperate images of the so-called ‘Third World’ are not novel. Aside from echoing colonial-
era portrayal of non-western peoples as incapable of self-governance due to their inherent 
deficiencies (see Said, 1978; Mudimbe, 1988), statebuilders’ narratives closely reflect the 
more recent in-vogue concept of the ‘failed state’. Rotberg (2002a:132), for instance, neatly 
epitomises the ‘all bad things go together’ outlook when writing about the dangers of ‘failed 
states’ soon after September 11, 2001. For him, they are characterised by an apocalyptic 
plethora of ills: 
‘a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising 
ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against 
their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an 
inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a 
collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life 
expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per 
capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and 
basic food shortages, leading to starvation.’ (2002a:132). 
 
The idea that all bad things go together, and the key role that conflict plays in 
contributing to such ‘crises’ is regularly expressed through the language of negative spirals. 
Phrases like ‘conflict-trap’ (Brown, 2011), ‘witch’s brew’ (UN, 2004:14), and ‘vicious cycles’ 
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(World Bank, 1997:15) are all lobbied to describe how poverty, underdevelopment, violent 
conflict, and state weakness are mutually reinforcing. Each is a cause and consequence of the 
other, so ‘when internal conflict erupts, the downward trajectory is not easy to reverse’ 
(Brahimi, 2007:2). These negative cycles are often treated with explicitly normative language 
of decay; they represent ‘descent into war and chaos’ (UN, 2004:3) or ‘descen[t] into fragility 
and conflict’ (DFID, 2010:13). An important point to note is that these ‘deadly cycle[s]’ (UN, 
2004:1) are perceived as having primarily internal origins within the state. Their 
consequences may be regional, but any external or global structural causes such as global 
market fluctuations, external interventions, or climate change are ignored. Failed states are 
viewed as implosion, a breakdown of state governance.  
Disease imagery adds to the dominant portrait of conflict as a destructive and 
disruptive force. Violent conflict is ‘chronic’ (UNDP, 2012:11), or ‘endemic’ (UNDP, 2012:17); 
it ‘breaks out’ and is contagious as its spill over effects ‘contaminate its immediate 
neighbours’ (Brahimi, 2007:2). Depicting ‘war-torn’ or ‘conflict afflicted’ states furthers the 
narrative of violent conflict as an aberration, outside the normal functioning of states. The 
chronic perception of conflict underpins policymakers’ emphasis on the tendency of conflict 
either to endure or to re-emerge in the same country after periods of peace. A statistic often 
repeated is that ninety percent of civil wars in the first decade of the 21st Century had 
experienced civil war within the preceding thirty years (World Bank, 2011:2; BSOS, 2011:9). 
The implication: stable peace is extremely difficult to regain as conflict and state decline 
spiral downwards together.   
 
No self-improvement 
The statebuilding policy literature thus represents violent conflict as morally undesirable for 
its direct human impacts, but also extremely destructive. According to these documents, it 
destroys state institutions, capacity, and legitimacy; producing weak and fragile states, 
instability, chaos and generally undermining prospects for economic development. In this 
sense, situations of conflict can be easily described as crises: trapped in negative spirals of 
economic, political and social decline and fragmentation. It represents a seemingly 
unmitigated disaster for the state, the domestic population, its neighbours and global 
security as a whole. Statebuilding policies suggest that, as a result, states undergoing violent 
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conflict are largely unable to improve their own situation because they are too divided and 
incapable to resurrect their own effective states alone. The UNDP makes the claim most 
explicitly: 
‘During the months and years after war, or during volatile transitions, governments 
lack the physical infrastructure, human resources, and rules and procedures to be 
able to deliver a peace dividend’ (UNDP, 2012:12). 
 
Fragile states ‘exhibit few capacities to recover, and have fatally ruptured the social 
contract with their citizens’ and are ‘unable to either prevent or recover without 
substantial assistance’ (UNDP, 2012:16). 
 
The UK’s key policy document on statebuilding also makes this kind of argument 
(BSOS, 2011:5). While non-violent conflict can produce positive change when it is 
successfully managed, it contends, this can only occur ‘through numerous formal and 
informal institutions’ such as elections, courts, and stable government (BSOS, 2011:5).  In 
contrast, ‘violence undermines the institutions and relationships on which long term-peace 
and stability depend’ (BSOS, 2011:5). If violent conflict is perceived to erode that which is 
necessary for managing social conflict in a way that is conducive for positive change, then 
state reconstruction, and thus recovery, is viewed as empirically impossible. 
 We can tie this point into, and situate it within, Bickerton’s (2007) argument about 
how statebuilders deny developing countries sovereignty. He argues (2007:102) that the 
concept of the ‘failed state’ perpetuates the perception that these states lack the ‘local 
capacity for political self-creation’. Bickerton suggests that this is based on certain normative 
attitudes about the non-west which western policymakers hold. My above analysis shows 
that the perception is also based, however, on a claim about the empirical nature of violent 
conflict. The notion that conflict is destructive serves to back-up the narrative, as states are 
deemed to be left torn, trapped in negative decline, and therefore unable to improve their 
own condition. 
The connected ideas are implicit in how statebuilders describe their own roles. An 
Agenda for Peace first spearheaded peacebuilding practices, part of which is the ‘rebuilding 
the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife’ (1992, para.15). 
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External intervention is deemed necessary for the re-construction of that which has been 
destroyed or damaged: particularly ‘rebuilding institutional infrastructure shattered during 
conflict’ (Kumar, 1997, quoted by Brahimi, 2007:3). The idea has lasted in the 21st Century: in 
2007 the United Nations Secretary-General’s Policy Committee defined peacebuilding as ‘a 
range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by 
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace and developments’. The very idea that ‘national 
capacities’ require ‘strengthening’ points to the belief that violent conflict erodes, if not 
eradicates, domestic agency for recovery.  
As a result, in a similar way to how Mutua (2001) characterises human rights 
activists, statebuilders ascribe themselves saviours with solutions. Indeed, the Overseas 
Development Institute (2009:1) begins its report by asking ‘what does it take to fix fragile 
states?’. External, rationalised policy is validated in order to ‘fix’ a ‘problem’ that cannot be 
‘fixed’ internally. Put simply, statebuilding is employed for ‘ending a conflict, rebuilding 
what has been destroyed by years of war and strife, ensuring that what has been built does 
not crumble again into conflict.’ (Brahimi, 2007:19). Prevention has also been emphasised by 
policymakers in more recent years. The UK’s strategy, for instance, highlights that due to the 
severity of the consequences of prolonged violent conflict, ‘it is far more cost-effective to 
invest in conflict prevention and de-escalation than to pay the costs of responding to violent 
conflict’ (BSOS, 2011:4). 
Precisely because of the narrative that violent civil conflict destroys states, their 
capacity and legitimacy. Counties are thus perceived to have little prospect of domestically 
rebuilding the state or political order in these conditions, as they are trapped by negative 
spirals of state decline and conflict. Statebuilding thus appears as the necessary, external 
impetus for reconstruction. Of course, it is often couched in cooperative terms of local-
ownership, the language of partnership, or simply as ‘lending a helping hand’ (Brahimi, 
2007:2). Whether this level of collaboration is true or merely rhetoric is an issue for separate 
debate. 
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III. An alternative narrative 
 
These representations of conflict are unlikely to surprise many people in western countries. 
Equating conflict with breakdown is not unique to statebuilding policies but is, as Branch 
(2011:27) points out, a dominant narrative in contemporary global governance discourses, 
and is applied to a variety of domains: 
‘in the economic, [conflict] leads to poverty and underdevelopment; in the social, it 
leads to a breakdown of social solidarity and civil society; in the cultural, it leads to a 
crisis of traditional values and authority; and in the legal, it leads to a breakdown of 
accountability and a rise of impunity’. 
 
Due to the fact that this is a prevailing conception in the west today, statebuilders’ 
narratives may appear to be ‘natural’ in the sense that they appear undeniably true and 
simply describing conflict as it is in reality. In contrast, this section aims to illuminate that 
many of the core tenets in statebuilders’ narratives are in fact highly contestable.  
Of course, the relationship between violence, conflict and states has been a 
historically staple focus of political thinking; Hobbes, Machiavelli, Weber, and Arendt 
would make suitable starting points for any discussion on the topic. In this thesis, I just 
examine the academic research most suitable for the purpose, those strongest arguments 
which diametrically oppose statebuilders’ narratives about violence as destructive of states. 
What results is a set of different academic works that I group together and term the 
‘domestic state formation literature’. It has varied academic roots in political, historical and 
sociological disciplines, and in terms of cases, it ranges from early modern Europe to 
contemporary so-called ‘Third World’. What binds them is the core claim that violent 
conflict has been a vital process for producing stable and peaceful forms of political 
governance, including highly capable modern states. 
The point of analysing this literature is not to side with it. I do not aim to prove, 
empirically or theoretically, that its narrative about conflict is correct or more convincing 
than that of the statebuilders. Instead, the purpose is simply to expose a major disjuncture 
between statebuilding policies and an influential academic literature on domestic state 
formation. Doing so will illustrate that statebuilders’ narratives about conflict and state 
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destruction are far from natural. This will open up space for the following sections to 
critically analyse why statebuilders take their view in spite of much opposing academic 
research. This will follow in the next sections. 
 
War makes states 
Charles Tilly was probably the most influential theorist on violent conflict and states in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Jones and Rodgers (2011:984) appear surprised that Tilly 
is a ‘notable absentee’ in the World Development Report 2011 on conflict, security and 
development. But it is no real surprise: Tilly’s work is absent from all statebuilding policy 
documents. He published a great deal, but his most famous and influential thesis remains 
that ‘war makes states and states make war’ (1992:67). This dictum summarises his 
examination of the roots of nation-states in early modern Europe (1975; 1985; 1992). They 
emerged between around 1400 and 1700 as unintended results, he claims, of the actions of 
elite power-holders such as lords. State formation in Europe was an extremely long process 
which involved a great deal of conflict between power-holding groups, coercive 
exploitation, protection rackets and banditry. These actors had self-interested aims; they 
wished to gain monopolies over power, territories and resource. In order to do so, power-
holders engaged in a mixture of eliminating, demobilising, disarming and co-opting rivals 
such as warlords with private armies.  
The development of the apparatus which we now consider the basis of the modern 
state, was an inadvertent consequence of these processes. Making war requires resources: 
tax-collecting bureaucracies, police-like forces, and courts were created to control territory 
and extract from local populations. As power-holders continued to expand territory and 
defeat their external and internal rivals, other elements of modern states took shape with the 
creation of standing armies, war industries and bureaucratic and educational institutions 
(1985:183). Over time, these processes produced nation-states: ‘relatively centralized, 
differentiated organization[s] the official of which more or less successfully claims control 
over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large 
contiguous territory’ (1985:170). Part of this process included popular resistance to coercion. 
With increasing control and extraction, European populations made demands for protection 
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of themselves and their property, to constrain power holders with courts, guaranteed rights, 
and representative institutions.   
Naturally, Tilly (1985; 1992) goes into great empirical detail on the violent centuries 
which included extensive Napoleonic Wars, the rise of capitalism, empires, and various 
revolutions. I have only described the general process; violent conflict looms large in it, 
interacting with ‘extraction, and capital accumulation… to shape European state making’ 
(1985:172). As Samuel Huntington (1968:127) puts it, ‘war was the great stimulus to 
statebuilding’: it creates the need for governance systems and spurs the concentration and 
accumulation of power. Coercive power enables extraction from domestic populations, but 
also their protection. Conflict does not simply destroy states, and to think in such a one-way 
dynamic ignores the winners and losers Tilly describes in European history. The most 
capable of waging conflict destroy their rivals, but in doing so the winning state strengthens 
its own capacities and expands its own monopoly of power over larger areas. This 
represents the strong claim that states are in many ways a product of violent conflict.  
A point of clarification is needed. Is Tilly just talking about interstate war? If so, his 
analysis might appear incomparable with statebuilders’ interest in intra-state civil conflict. 
But the two are not separate in Tilly’s histories. Because war making is a continual process of 
creating and redefining the state and its borders, the distinction between intra and interstate 
wars does not make much sense. Once state borders are codified, as they are in the today’s 
UN-based international system, the distinction works. However, when in civil wars there 
exist sub-state power-holders which challenge the government, desire or border changes, 
then surely the Tillian framework about conflicting power-holding rivals applies.  
Tilly’s work has been debated extensively, but this is not the focus of this thesis. 
Rather, the point is that his conception of the positive relationship between violent conflict 
and state formation has been highly influential in academic scholarship. Recently, for 
instance, Ian Morris’s (2014) popular book War! What is it good for? takes up the theme of 
generative violence, and goes beyond Tilly’s focus on Europe by arguing that over the last 
10,000 years, war has been the only way through which humans have been able to create 
peaceful societies.  
Cohen, Brown and Organski (1981:902) echo Tilly, by suggesting that the European 
state formation process was ‘a long and violent struggle pitting the agents of state 
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centralization against myriad local and regional opponents’. Their interesting contribution 
to the research on European state-making is their critique of the common interpretation of 
violence as political decay. Over a quarter of a century on from their work, it remains a 
widely accepted narrative which can be seen in the statebuilding policies. Intrastate violence 
may appear on the surface to simply indicate political decay but, they argue, it usually 
indicates a movement towards political order because it constitutes part of the process of 
accumulation and ‘centralization of power resources’ in newly-emerging or weak states 
(1981:902). Like Tilly, the fundamental conception relevant to this thesis is that conflict 
actually contributes to state formation and strengthening. It is not simply erosive of 
governance, but spurs its development.  
In contrast statebuilders’ narrative that all bad things go together, the academic 
literature accepts the paradox that terrible violence can produce good things like political 
stability and order. Sheri Berman’s (2007) application of Tillian logic to democracy in Europe 
further opens up to question statebuilders’ representations. She illustrates that the 
emergence of democratic states in Europe was extremely violent too. Not only was this the 
case in the early modern period, but also in the revolutions and catastrophic wars of the 
early 20th Century. At the end of the Second World War, for instance, many authoritarian 
regimes had been left defeated, and their ideology discredited. Publics in Italy and West 
Germany were able to pursue democracy and reclaim the ‘institutions and practices of 
democracy’ that remained from previous eras (Berman, 2007:37). Modern states, as well as 
modern democracies, are presented as having a history of ‘struggle, conflict and even 
violence’ (Berman, 2007:38; see also Bermeo, 1997; 2003).  
 
Contemporary state formation 
There has also been a great deal of scholarship on state formation and consolidation in the 
so-called ‘Third’ or ‘developing’ world. The relationship between violent civil conflict and 
state formation are complex and extensively debated and nuanced in the wide range of case 
studies. Particularly prominent cases about which the overarching theory that states are 
produces by civil conflicts has argued to stand true include, for instance, Eritrea (Müller, 
2006, 2012; Clapham, 2000; Iyob, 1997; Pool, 2001),  Mozambique (Bertelsen, 2016), Lebanon 
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(Delatolla, 2016), Taiwan, South Korea (Herbst, 1990) and Somalia and Somaliland 
(Menkhaus, 2007; Walls, 2009; Balthasar, 2013). 
One section of these studies researches states that were consolidated or formed as a 
result of liberation wars or insurgencies. These have been termed ‘post-liberation states’ 
(Dorman, 2006), a perspective which highlights how warring parties can actually be viewed 
as capable of, and even interested in, governance. Reno’s (20008, 2011) analysis of 
insurgency in Africa highlights that ‘rebels’, which are commonly blamed for causing 
instability and anarchy, often aim to build political power and institutions. Since the late 
colonial period at the middle of the twentieth century, he argues, much of Africa’s conflicts 
have been over political control. In general, rebels have aimed to overthrow and install 
themselves in government at the state level or, particularly since the 1990s, ‘parochial’ rebels 
have developed political programmes and tried to administer sub-state communities in 
opposition to the state (2008:144, 2011). 
More recently, Huang (2016) has advanced this scholarship on rebel governance by 
researching the wartime origins of democratization. In attempting to explain why so many 
states emerge from war more democratic, she uses empirical data to demonstrate that it is a 
result of how rebels govern the civilians in their territories.  When rebels rely on them and 
extract heavily for support during war, these civilians become politically mobilised: they 
gain an understanding and information about political rights, the role of the state in relation 
to them, and potential alternatives (2016:9). This leads them to apply greater pressure to 
victorious new regimes to democratize. Uganda, Mozambique and Tajikistan are the main 
cases she explores to demonstrate this process.  
In a different vein, there is also an emerging literature on illiberal state building in 
Africa: where authoritarian and violent means are employed by ruling governments which 
consolidates the state and boosts its power (Jones et al., 2013; Fisher and Anderson, 2015). 
While African states are often considered weak by policymakers and academics alike, these 
works illustrate that certain regimes today have successfully followed state-building 
aspirations, such as Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola. These states have been 
effective in centralising economic resources and establishing ‘a stranglehold over the 
political economy’, and using this to expand and solidify state institutions and the regime’s 
control of them. State-led coercion has maintained political control by cracking down on the 
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media, disrupting protests and eliminating political opposition. Often, western counter-
terrorism agendas are being manipulated by these states to gain resources, build armies and 
national security structures (Fisher and Anderson, 2015). Without delving into further detail, 
these scholars’ overarching argument is that African states’ institutions and control over 
their territories are being strengthened through authoritarian and violent measures. Dan 
Slater (2010) has also described similar processes in Southeast Asia, where state 
consolidation has been led by elites in response to threats and fears over violent eruption 
from major ethnic or class divisions in society.  
Finally, consideration must be given to those scholars who interrogate the validity of 
the ‘war makes states’ thesis in non-western contexts.  These efforts are fuelled by the 
observation, stemming from Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982) influential article, that African 
states are internally weak. While they possess juridical recognition from the international 
community, they lacked the empirical capacity and internal sources of legitimacy of modern 
states. This is because, they argue, these states were arbitrary colonial constructions which 
were weakly developed as political units (1982:14). Their distinction between the 
international and domestic sources of statehood appears to have since inspired scholars' 
explanations of why strong states have not emerged in much of the 'Third World' over the 
last century.  The international system is commonly deemed responsible because it prevents 
the opportunity for Tillian processes to create states through war (Herbst, 1990; Desch, 1996; 
Sørensen, 2001; Taylor and Botea, 2008). According to these accounts, war might indeed 
make states, but the post-1945 UN-led system has entrenched state boundaries, 
delegitimized, outlawed and quashed interstate and intrastate war, including the validity of 
separatist movements (especially those based on ethnicity). Many non-western states have 
therefore never had same incentive from war to develop states. Rival power-holders cannot 
defeat or be defeated by others, nor do existing states face the prospect that their territories 
may fragment into smaller units. Unlike the violent anarchic European context, today’s 
international system protects the status quo organisation of states. 
For the policy practice of contemporary international statebuilding, we can imagine 
that these arguments could be interpreted in two different ways to influence policy. First, 
proponents could argue that the implausibility for Tillian state formation today means that 
international intervention is all the more necessary to help existing states gain capabilities 
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and legitimacy. However, this line of argument is in fact never made by in statebuilding 
policy documents; Tilly or the idea that violent conflict could be in any way generative is 
ignored in the first place. 
Second, the opposite conclusion, which has actually been argued, is that if weak and 
tumultuous states result from the fact that Tillian processes are not being allowed to occur in 
non-western contexts, the solution might be to allow them (Luttwak, 1999; Herbst, 2004).  
Herbst (2004) posits that state failure is a normal feature of the world. States defeat each 
other, states fracture and split apart for various reasons like ‘problems in the collection of 
taxation, the primitive nature of basic transport, shifting military balances, and the inability 
to overcome religious, ethnic, and national divisions’ (2004:303).  Yet, when states aren’t 
allowed to fail, the international system is guilty of maintaining unviable political 
formations. The international community needs to let go of idea that status quo state 
boundaries must be maintained: ‘let them fail’ instead, and accept ‘the cycle of state creation 
and destruction’ through which ‘political orders evolve by changing form and scale’ 
(2004:316). Luttwak (1999:36) makes a similar point about the paradoxes of conflict; while 
civil war is ‘a great evil’ it also brings peace because either one side defeats the other, or both 
are so exhausted they come to a resolution. Intervention during conditions of conflict or 
unstable peace ‘systematically’ prevents the transformation when war eventually brings 
peace (1999:37). The international community should thus ‘give war chance’. Both authors’ 
arguments rest on the conception that violent conflict is generative of new political 
formations which tend towards more order and stability, even if this costs a great number of 
lives and takes decades.  
Any attempt to cover the literature on the positive relationship between conflict and 
state formation would be inexhaustive; this short overview is undoubtedly so. Yet the key 
points have been made. There is an extensive body of work which, despite having various 
perspectives, arguments and empirical case studies, promotes a general narrative that 
violent conflict has, can, and may even be necessary to produce modern states as we know 
them today. All of these arguments are, of course, still open for debate, but the point is that 
they undoubtedly represent reputable, well-researched and reviewed academic scholarship. 
The next section explores and clarifies the main divergences between these works and the 
statebuilding policy narratives.    
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IV. The juxtaposition 
 
Having examined the statebuilding policy and academic domestic state formation literatures 
separately, it is possible to draw out the key differences in their conceptions of violent civil 
conflict and its relationship with states. This requires us to treat both sets of literature as 
broadly coherent, at least in their most fundamental ideas on this topic. Three key 
conceptual differences between the narratives appear.  
 
The effects of violent conflict 
The first crucial distinction concerns an empirical claim about the consequences of violent 
conflict for states in which such conflict occurs. On the one hand, statebuilding policies 
represent violent conflict as a destructive process. It erodes the state’s capacity and 
legitimacy, and thus represents a form of breakdown. The coherence of neighbouring states, 
too, can be weakened through the transnational spill-overs of illicit trade and migration. In 
this narrative, different types of violence are not distinguished: civil war, insurgency, 
banditry and organised crime are all considered destructive of governance.  
In contrast, the domestic state formation literature suggests that violent conflict has 
the potential to generate states. Of course, the strength of this argument can vary. However, 
those scholars I have examined have not gone so far as to claim that conflict inevitably 
produces states, although oftentimes it does appear that conflict has a necessary, but not 
sufficient, role in the creation of modern states. Conflict is perceived to be highly contingent 
in its effects; whereas for statebuilders it is represented as solely and inevitably destructive. 
Even at the most minimal argument – that violent conflict can or might contribute towards 
state formation – it is still a far cry from statebuilders’ narratives which conceive of no such 
potential. For statebuilders, violent conflict is necessarily antithetical to state formation: all 
bad things go together. 
 
The prospects for countries in conflict 
Different conceptions of the effects of conflict lead to a second divergence regarding the 
prospects for states in these situations. For statebuilders, as conflict is destructive, ‘war-torn’ 
countries are incapable of improving their own situation. In negative spirals of state decline 
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and conflict, violence is a consequence and a cause of state weakness. States are thus deemed 
trapped, declining capacity means that there is ever-smaller chance for organic positive 
transformation. In contrast, for domestic state formation scholars, violent conflict itself can 
act as a stimulus for positive change. Conflict and recovery are not, here, separate processes, 
but are interlinked because transformation occurs through violence and war. Weinstein 
(2005) terms this ‘autonomous recovery’, and calls for interventionist policymakers to 
recognise that states like Uganda have been able to achieve long-term peace and 
development without external intervention.  
This position demands a reckoning with the perceived paradoxes of violent conflict 
which, despite being an abhorrent process, still tends to produce peace (Luttwak, 1999:36). 
The link between violence and political change is not a new observation. For instance, at the 
end of the 19th Century, U.S. Admiral Stephen Luce (1891:672) suggested that ‘war is one of 
the greatest agencies by which human progress is effected’. The paradox cuts to the core of 
how to understand political change and, thus, the possibilities of politics. Huntington’s 
(1968) influential elucidation of this issue frames this as a critique of modernisation theories. 
He suggests that economic development and political stability do not necessarily evolve in 
parallel. Social and economic modernisation, which occurs through growth and increasing 
social mobility, are instead often hugely destabilising processes that lead to civil violence 
(1968:46). The tensions of progress are expressed in the domestic state formation literature in 
the overarching narrative that conflict can lead to positive transformation, but not 
necessarily with a linear trajectory or pre-determined destination. Whereas, in statebuilders’ 
narratives, the prospects are binary: violent conflict leads to state decay, while peace is 
necessary for raising state legitimacy and capacity.  
Part of the reason for this divergence is that the domestic state formation literature 
also perceives greater significant of other violent actors. They suggest that non-state groups 
can be political and often attempt to form breakaway sub-state units of governance. The 
possibilities for new political formations are wide: states can fragment, implode, or simply 
alter their boundaries in relation to other states. In contrast, in the statebuilders’ narratives, 
existing states are either strengthened in peace or weakened through conflict, there is no 
mention of changing current entrenched formations.  
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Policy Implications 
As a result of the two preceding differences, the bodies of literature offer diverging 
recommendations for how external actors should act concerning ‘failing’, ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ 
states undergoing conflict. For statebuilders, the policy implication is obvious: if conflict 
destroys states, and they are thereby incapable of reconstructing themselves, external 
intervention is required to do so in order to stop conflict, prevent its recurrence, and 
transform states. The title of Call and Wyeth’s 2009 book Building States to Build Peace neatly 
summarises this aim.  
As the domestic state formation literature is rooted in academia, scholars are often 
less interested in with explicitly recommending policy options. Tilly (1985:169), for instance, 
tries to clarify that his analysis of European history should not be taken as a blueprint for 
contemporary policy: ‘in no simple sense can we read the future of Third World countries 
from the pasts of European countries’. He does hope that it ‘will help us to grasp what is 
happening today, perhaps even to do something about it’, but this remains an exceptionally 
non-committal and vague comment (1985:169, my emphasis). It is understandable why 
many scholars may be keen to evade the troubling policy implications of their work. For 
instance, having illustrated that some wars can lead to democratization Huang (2016:11) 
feels it necessary to explicitly state that she ‘prefer[s] nonviolence over violence’ and does 
not ‘extol war for its potential for benefits’. As noted in the previous section, Luttwak (1999) 
and Herbst (2004) not only face up to, but forcefully promote the policy implications of the 
positive connection between violent conflict and state formation. To ‘let them fail’ or ‘give 
war a chance’ is more likely, they claim, to establish peaceful, capable and legitimate states 
than external statebuilding interventions.  
The three conceptual divergences concern the effects of conflict, the prospects of 
states undergoing conflict, and the policy implications. When we take these conceptions at 
their most general level, a three-part argument is produced by each set of literature about 
the nature of violent civil conflict and its relationship with states. This can be represented in 
the table: 
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Statebuilding policy literature 
 
1. The effects of violent conflict are 
destructive of states and undermine 
governance. 
 
2. States undergoing conflict lack the 
capacity to domestically reconstruct 
states, re-establish political order or 
improve their situation. 
 
Therefore 
 
3. External intervention is required to 
build states.  
 
Domestic state formation literature 
 
1. The effects of violent conflict can 
often generate states. 
 
 
2. Conflict tends to resolve itself and 
stable, peaceful forms of political 
governance are likely to be produced 
by conflict in the long term. 
 
Therefore 
 
3. For the long term benefit of these 
countries, international inaction may 
be preferable. 
 
 
Interestingly, both sets of arguments appear simultaneously pessimistic and 
optimistic about the possibilities for politics in situations of conflict. For statebuilders, 
conflict is so destructive; it has enormous human costs and takes extensive time and 
resources to rebuild ‘failing’ states. But there remains a kind of optimism that states can be 
built peacefully. The contention is that if the correct technical approaches can be combined 
with the international political will, then the international community is not powerless in the 
face of violence. The two-sidedness can be seen in the domestic state formation literature 
too, in a different way. It is pessimistic that, while strong, stable and well-functioning states 
can be created by humans, it often comes at the price of violent conflict, war, and major 
upheaval. There is still some optimism: in abhorrent conflict there lies the generative 
potential for new, lasting forms of peaceful political governance.  
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V. Understanding Statebuilding 
 
Clearly, statebuilders’ narratives concerning the relationship between conflict and states 
represent a radical departure from an established set of academic research on domestic state 
formation. Despite this, statebuilders do not explicitly regard their conceptions as 
particularly unusual, and nor do they outwardly recognise any need to justify why they 
hold their view as opposed to any other possible ones. Having exposed the disjuncture, this 
last section explores why statebuilders’ promote their narratives, and what the impacts of 
them are for policy. To do so, I draw on liberal humanitarianism. This lens will help reveal 
how statebuilding representations of conflict are infused by fundamental humanitarian 
moral attitudes. By carefully analysing statebuilding in this way, I also shed light on the 
complexity with which it poses problems and legitimises its own solutions. In particular, 
this section will illustrate how, precisely because of the particular narratives about the 
destructive relationship between conflict and states, policymakers place upon statebuilding 
a multifaceted authority:  it appears as a moral and pragmatic practice, necessary in the 
urgent and long term, in order to promote both human and state security. 
 
Humanitarianism 
Statebuilding is rarely explicitly discussed in terms of humanitarianism. In fact, it may 
appear to be its opposite in a number of ways. Humanitarianism is usually associated with 
short term relief, altruism and its proponents often declare themselves apolitical and display 
a ‘pretence that somehow it is possible to stay outside politics’ (Rieff, 2002:75). Whereas, 
statebuilding is a long-term, transformation project which policymakers explicitly describe 
as political, as they pursue political reforms and collaboration with domestic governments 
and other political groups. Statebuilding practices (Iraq and Afghanistan most acutely) have 
also received far more public criticism for being self-interested or a form of neo-imperial 
empire.  
However, a different picture emerges if we use ‘humanitarianism’ in a minimal way: 
not as a sphere of practice with its long history and varied internal debates, but instead to 
denote its core set of universalist moral principles (Ignatieff, 2001:9). These are ‘to respond to 
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the suffering of others regardless of their identity, to act selflessly, to do what can be done to 
save lives, and to place humanity above all considerations’ (Barnett and Weiss, 2008:6). 
The term ‘humanitarian’ might appear slightly confusing because, today, these moral 
principles are expressed in the policies and ideas surrounding human rights and human 
security. As Slim (2002:14) points out, human rights have been the most important 
development for humanitarian morals in the post-1945 era by institutionalising them in a 
‘moral, political and legal framework for affirming universal human values’. Since the 1990s 
this has combined with the ‘human security’ framework which gained major prominence in 
global governance institutions. The concept first emerged in the UN Human Development 
Report 1994; it stresses the need to look beyond state security which focuses on military 
security, territory and state integrity. Human security instead highlights the importance of 
social, economic, environmental and other non-military threats towards individuals and 
communities (Paris, 2001; Hunter and McIntosh, 2010). The shift in global concerns followed 
the end of the Cold War which reduced threat of interstate conflict. International 
organisations and states’ foreign policies oriented towards, and directed more resources to, 
human security activities such as aid, development, human rights promotion, peacekeeping, 
and peacebuilding.  
Does statebuilding reflect humanitarian moral concerns? Contrary to the initial 
temptation to place statebuilding in a different category, I argue that it does. The depictions 
of violent civil conflict are clearly underpinned by the same universal morals about giving 
primacy to human life, saving lives, relieving suffering and protecting human rights. 
Conflict is not only condemned for its direct human consequences, but its indirect impacts 
on the state are also described in extremely moralistic terms. The state weakness produced 
causes more violence, insecurity, poverty, underdevelopment, ‘chaos’ and generally brings 
‘fear and horror to humanity’ (UN, 1992, para.13). As the state is considered the only 
legitimate bearer of the responsibilities to protect and provide the human rights of its 
population, the destruction of the state is deemed a human rights issue.  
To argue that statebuilding is not fundamentally humanitarian in its moral outlook 
would be to simply ignore how statebuilders represent conflict. One need not look hard. 
Annan, in discussing African conflict, neatly highlights the dominance of humanitarian 
morals in statebuilding: ‘preventing…wars is no longer a matter of defending States or 
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protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself’ (1998:para.3). Policymakers 
deem ‘failing’ states to have little capability to pursue their own reconstruction, but it is a 
liberal humanitarian step to claim, as they do, that the responsibility falls on international 
actors. Paris and Sisk’s (2009:14) call for action illustrates the point: ‘retreating from the 
postwar statebuilding project would be tantamount to abandoning tens of millions of people 
to lawlessness, predation, disease, and fear’. 
However, to conclude that statebuilding is only humanitarian also seems wrong. 
Nuanced analysis demonstrates that violent conflict is not represented solely as an issue of 
human security for the concerned population. It is also regularly narrated within the 
framework of traditional state security concerns. Regional stability and the security of states 
in other parts of the world are believed to be threatened by the global impacts of failing 
states such as illicit trade of arms and drugs, terrorism, mass refugee flows and market 
fluctuations. Is it simply a case that different organisations have different concerns? One 
might expect that states’ foreign policies show little regard for human security, while 
development-oriented bodies are less interested in the security of distant states. True, there 
is some noticeable leaning; institutions like the UN, UNDP and DFID are more forthcoming 
with emotive description. Despite this, however, in general, all organisations with 
statebuilding policies problematise ‘failing’ states as both human and state security issues. 
The UK policy paper on statebuilding neatly summarises this duality between human and 
state security: ‘Working to address instability and conflict upstream is a sound investment… 
it is both morally right and in our national interest’ (BSOS, 2011:2). Policymakers are able to 
imbue statebuilding with this dual authority, I argue, precisely because conflict is presented 
as destructive of states. This constructs any conflict as a potential human and global security 
threat.  
Kai Koddenbrock (2012:216) suggests that international statebuilding activists 
possess an attitude that reflects what Fassin (2009, 2012) has termed a ‘humanitarianisation 
of politics’. This is when ‘moral sentiments’ and ‘the emotions that direct our attention to the 
suffering of others and make us want to remedy them’ gain an ‘essential force in 
contemporary politics’ (Fassin, 2012:1). Fassin is not focusing on statebuilding, but argues 
that this has characterised both domestic and international politics in general since the late 
twentieth century. Koddenbrock (2012) may be correct that practitioners in the field have a 
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mindset that reframes all political issues as simply humanitarian ones. But the above 
analysis demonstrates that the critique cannot validly apply to statebuilding policies 
themselves. Rather than simply a ‘humanitarianisation’ (Fassin, 2012) or ‘moralization’ 
(Branch, 2011:24) of international politics, close examination sheds light on how 
statebuilding policies actually fuse humanitarian and traditional state security frameworks. 
Interventions are legitimised by both simultaneously. 
 
Urgency 
Going further with the lens of humanitarianism, the universal moral principles of relieving 
suffering and saving lives lend themselves to the ideas of ‘urgency’ and ‘emergency’. As 
Rieff (2002:67) points out, as humanitarian universal morals place primary value on human 
life, substantial threats to it anywhere can be conceived as a ‘crisis’. The consequences are 
serious. Laïdi (2001) offers a broad critique of modern politics for being overly impulsive to 
such calls of ‘crisis’; as he notes, urgency demands and ‘legitimizes immediate action’. I 
argue that statebuilding policy documents also echo humanitarianism in this respect, as they 
too narrate states undergoing conflict as in ‘crisis’ (DFID, 2010:51; World Bank, 2011:11). 
Violent conflict is made synonymous with breakdown, and the imagery of spirals of decline 
is deemed to have disease-like chronic impact on ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’ states.  
Branch (2011:24) argues that ‘the humanitarian human rights discourse… is subject to easy 
instrumentalization because of its invocation of crisis and emergency’. Statebuilding policy, 
however, poses as even more urgent, as it moves beyond the language of simply 
humanitarian emergency: civil conflict is narrated as a political, social, economic, 
development, human rights and even global crisis. This is made possible because conflict is 
deemed antithetical to state formation and political order; it is only erosive of states. These 
representations legitimise immediate external statebuilding interventions to halt or prevent 
human and global disaster.   
However, again we must ask: is statebuilding therefore presented solely as an urgent 
necessity? It’s an important question because, if so, then statebuilding may be open to some 
of the same critiques of humanitarianism. The most powerful critique on the issue of 
urgency in politics is offered by Laïdi (2001). He (2001) argues that humanitarian 
interventions reflect a ‘devalorization of the future’, whereby the international community 
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places overwhelming importance on urgent action while eschewing any meaningful long 
term perspectives. But, having closely examined the statebuilding policy literature, it 
statebuilders clearly do conceive of themselves as offering long term solutions to conflict, as 
well as short term ‘stabilisation’.  
This is because they conceive conflict as both an immediate and long term problem: 
conflict is morally undesirable and destabilising, but its consequences will continue to 
multiple as the countries are trapped in negative spirals of state weakness and conflict. The 
prospects for long-term peace and statebuilding are deemed minimal. The danger is that the 
‘fragile’ state will endure a prolonged collapse, having abhorrent impacts on its own people 
but also regional and global stability. Unlike the academic domestic state formation scholars, 
statebuilders conceive that no positive transformation can come of conflict even over 
decades and centuries. The only means for achieving long term peace and stability is the 
presence of a capable and legitimate state, and this can only arise through external 
intervention. Therefore, statebuilding policies do not simply devalorize the future. Rather, 
the way they problematise conflict as both an urgent and long term problem, legitimises 
statebuilders’ interventions as vital to bring violence to a close and stabilise the country, 
while also being necessary for future stability, and prevention of a relapse into conflict.  
Here, a major divergence opens between the statebuilding policy and domestic state 
formation literatures. The latter implies that there is a choice at stake between the ‘good’ in 
the present and the long term future. Luttwak (1999) and Herbst’s (2004) policy-oriented 
works make this most clear: to intervene immediately in a conflict or ‘failing’ state may 
appear good in the short term – and if successful will relieve present suffering – but this is 
counterproductive in the long term. Truly sustainable peace can only be achieved through 
domestic processes of state formation and consolidation which, tragically, often involve 
conflict. The choice is thus to act now and undermine long term peace while trying to 
minimise the current symptoms of conflict and soothing one’s present conscience, or choose 
inaction with the conviction that the long term interests of these countries, and the rest of the 
world, will be better served.  
In contrast, statebuilders can avoid this choice because their narrative of civil conflict 
as purely destructive of states. As they deny it can organically generate stable and legitimate 
forms of political governance even in the long term, statebuilders perceive of no benefits to 
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inaction. It would only allow the situation to worsen, according to the narrative. Therefore, 
the paradigm that statebuilders offer is one where statebuilding holds moral and pragmatic 
authority as a necessary action to solve the urgent and long term problems of conflict and 
state decline.  
Using the lens of liberal humanitarianism has facilitated a deep exploration into why 
statebuilders offer their particular narratives about conflict and states, and furthermore, the 
genuine complexity of these narratives which defy easy categorisation. Through 
policymakers’ representations of conflict as destructive, statebuilding is able to possess two 
key dualities. Firstly, it portends to be both a solution to the human and state security 
problems of conflict. It thereby gains the moral authority of humanitarian universalist 
values, and the authority as a pragmatic (and perhaps ‘realist’) strategy of intervention for 
powerful states to pursue. Secondly, statebuilding can be posed as urgent while also 
necessary for long term peace and stability.      
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has critically examined a subject often neglected: how statebuilding policymakers 
understand and represent the ‘problems’ which they seek to tackle. In particular, it offers a 
unique exploration of statebuilders’ narratives about the relationship between violent civil 
conflict and states, their formation, strengthening and weakening. The aims of this thesis 
have been fourfold: to expose these narratives; to compare (and thus call into question) them 
with an established body of academic literature on domestic state formation; to attempt to 
understand why the narratives statebuilders promote are so radically different to those 
found in the academic work; finally, to explain the important policy functions of these 
narratives.  
In doing so, I have made a series of three connected arguments. Firstly, the 
statebuilding discourse presents violent conflict as a force that erodes and destroys states, 
their institutions, legitimacy, coherence and capacity. According to this narrative, processes 
of conflict cannot produce legitimate forms of governance, but are only disrupt them. 
Secondly, this is in marked contrast to the domestic state formation literature, rooted in 
historical, political and sociological perspectives, which suggests that conflict in fact has the 
potential, and may even be necessary, to generate legitimate and stable forms of political 
governance, including modern states as we understand them today.  
Rather than siding with one of the narratives, or attempting to empirically prove that 
one or the other is ‘correct’, the third argument remains critical and conceptual. Drawing on 
and applying Bacchi’s (2009) general approach to policy analysis which recognises that 
policymakers construct problems in ways which promote certain policy responses to them, 
this thesis has provided a unique reflection on the effects of statebuilders’ narratives about 
the relationship between conflict and states. It has illustrated that they help legitimise 
statebuilding policies.  
By representing violent conflict as destructive of states, situations of conflict are 
viewed as in permanent crisis. Such countries are trapped in self-perpetuating downward 
spirals of conflict and state decline. It is therefore deemed impossible that domestic 
resolutions, recovery, or forms of political governance can be organically produced under 
these conditions. This justifies external statebuilding interventions as the only way to 
Benjamin Simpson     s1899465  36 
achieve order and stability, in the short and long term, through constructing or 
strengthening states. Humanitarian ethics fuse with the state security concerns of 
international players to present conflict an issue of saving lives, protecting human rights, 
and guarding global stability.  This legitimises statebuilding as a necessary practice to 
consolidate fragile peace, resolve ongoing conflict, or prevent future conflict.  
Going further, this ultimately produces a stifling effect. By diverging from the 
academic domestic state formation literature, statebuilders vilify inaction. But if we take the 
academic scholarship seriously, this could actually suppress the opportunities for the 
development of alternative forms of political organisation which may be generated through 
violent conflict. Such possibilities could include re-structuring of the existing state 
boundaries; the disaggregation of large or multinational states into more coherent units of 
identity, loyalty and governance; or even the creation of non-state models of political 
organisation which do not resemble the currently dominant nation state. Narrating conflict 
as antithetical to political order helps justify statebuilders’ interventions which, in turn, 
maintain the status quo international arrangements. Any contingent possibilities for political 
change through violence is deemed empirically unworkable, as well as a human and state 
security threat. 
Further research on state formation, strengthening and weakening will undoubtedly 
continue, as it is a core topic of politics, sociology, anthropology and history. But my 
findings also further emphasise the importance of academic scholarship here, as it can 
research these topics while insulated from the policy-focused demands and biases of states 
and international organisations. In terms of advancing this specific thesis project, which has 
only examined statebuilding in the post-Cold War era, and has treated it as a consistent time 
frame, further research pursue disaggregation. For instance, studying policy narratives 
before the 1990s, or distinguishing different periods since the Cold War, will introduce the 
element of policy change over time. Alternatively, while I have grouped together different 
types of organisations and states which promote statebuilding, further studies could delve 
deeper, beyond their overarching commonalities, and into their differences. 
As a novel contribution to existing critical approaches to statebuilding, this thesis 
also implies some broader points for future critical thinking. The depictions of the world 
offered by powerful institutions must not be taken for granted, especially those which fund 
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and deploy enormously expensive and invasive statebuilding interventions. Reflecting on 
how ‘problems’ and their ‘solutions’ are posed may not generate any clear answers about 
the nature of conflict and states, and is unlikely to satisfy the desires of policy-oriented 
academics or practitioners to know what to do about civil conflict around the world. It will 
nevertheless provide the analytical tools to question those policies, and the narratives on 
which they rely, that often appear incontestable. On this note, this thesis has highlighted the 
importance of distinguishing normative and empirical claims about conflict. Our 
understandable humanitarian attitudes towards any mass violence must not be allowed to 
determine our views about the empirical relationship between conflict and states. 
How we conceptualise the relationship between conflict and states is not merely a 
lofty, academic matter. It has concrete effects on international policy. Critically examining 
the relationship between how ‘problems’ and their ‘solutions’ are constructed and publicly 
narrated is vital for understanding how statebuilding, and other global governance 
activities, are made possible and legitimised. 
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